Spacelog Apollo 11

Say again, 11?

Roger. We're all listening. Go ahead.

Look up the Dow Jones Industrials for us.

Apollo 11, this is Houston. We see you in P00. When you can give us ACCEPT, we have a state vector and target load uplink ready for you.

Roger, Houston. I'm going ahead and start the computer.

Apollo 11, we've completed the uplink. The computer's yours.

Apollo 11, this is Houston. Over.

Go ahead.

Roger. With respect to the Dow Jones industrials, since closing on Tuesday afternoon the 15th up to about 1:05 p.m. Houston time this afternoon, why, the effect has been a net drop; that is, minus 6 points on the industrial average. So far today since opening, the Dow Jones industrial average has gone down by 11.05 after rising 1 1/2 shortly after opening. Today's performance on the utilities is a drop of 1.63, and railroads a drop of 1.58. Over.

Every flight has to have some disadvantages, I guess.

Roger. There is some speculation that you all are responsible for that 1 1/2 point rise right after opening.

Well, don't blame the 11 point drop on us, anyway.

Roger.

Apollo 11, this is Houston. If you have a minute or so free, I wonder if we could get Mike to give us a little bit of clarification on what happened around about the time of docking. We copied him as mentioning that contact was very smooth, almost imperceptible; and we're a little bit inquisitive or curious about his remarks as to what happened after probe retraction. Over.

Roger. I docked in CMC AUTO, and as I said, I wasn't really sure of the moment of contact. I kept cross checking the docking probe indicators. I got two barber poles indicating that the three capture latches—not capture latches, but the three … latches had made, and we were soft docked. And at that time the situation looked very stable. So, I went to CMC FREE, glanced back out the window and it still looked stable; and I fired primary 2 bottle. And at that time, a gyration began between the two vehicles due I'm not sure to what. Perhaps the LM thrusting or perhaps it was building up prior, and I hadn't noticed it. But anyway, during the RETRACT of the probe, there were yaw—my yaw excursions of, I would guess, around 15 degrees, and I had to come back on, take the FREE switch and throw it back to AUTO, and try to damp them out; and I guess Neil was doing the same in the LM. I'll let him tell you about his side of it. And I though that we were not going to get a successful RETRACT and hard dock. However, in about—oh, I guess 6 or 8 seconds, I did hear—could see the situation damping out, and then we heard the noise indicating the docking latches had fired; and later on when I got into the tunnel, all 12 of them had properly engaged.

Roger.

And on the LM side, we were in AGS MIN deadband ATT HOLD; and at contact, I thrusted plus X; and shortly after that we had a sizable attitude oscillation and thruster firing, so we opened up the deadband to MAX and manually flew the vehicle into stable attitude during the retraction. It went to OFF after …

Apollo 11, this is Houston. I have your midcourse correction 5 PAD available when you're ready to copy.

Stand by.

Houston, Apollo 11. Ready to copy.

11, this is Houston. Midcourse correction number 5, RCS/G&N: 26025, pitch and yaw trim NA, TIG 150 29 5453, minus 00048, plus all balls, plus 00001 075 159 328; HA is NA; HP plus 00230 00048 011 00048; sextant star 03 0908 382. Boresite star block, none available. Latitude plus 1102, minus 17204 11803 36275 195 03 33, GDC align, Deneb and Vega, 007 144 068, no ullage, of course, four quad thrusting. Over. Readback.

Roger. Midcourse number 5, RCS/G&N: 26025, pitch and yaw NA, 150 29 5453, minus 00048, plus all zeros, plus 00001 075 159 328, NA, plus 00230 00048 011 00048 03 0908 382, NA three times, plus 1102, minus 17204 11803 36275 195 03 33, Deneb and Vega, 007 144 068, and four quads for the burn. Over.

Apollo 11, this is Houston. Over.

Roger. Go ahead, Houston.

Roger. If Neil has a free minute, we've got a question or two regarding the CO₂ partial pressure and water in the suit loop discrepancies noted yesterday. Over.

Go ahead.

Roger, 11. Was water noted in both suits or only in yours, Neil?

I think only in my suit.

Okay. Can you locate that occurrence for us in time when you first noticed water in the suit, either by mission time or relation to any particular event?

I think it was after insertion sometime, Bruce. I don't remember exactly when. I—It was when we were in orbit and had our—after we took our helmets off.

Roger. Did you call it to us when you first noticed it, or was it sometime after when you called it?

I'd guess it might have been probably 20 minutes after I noticed it that I mentioned it to you.

Roger. Was this noticing the water accompanied by erratic CO₂ partial pressure readings, or was that a separate problem? Over.

Well, the water problem evidenced itself before we noted any erratic motions of the PC02 gage.

Roger. And what was the relative sequence on selecting water separator number 2 and the secondary CO₂ canister; that is, did you go to the secondary water separator first and then the secondary CO₂? Over.

Go ahead.

I should mention, Bruce, that when I went to water secondary—water separator to secondary there, I didn't notice any change. But about after 15 minutes or 20 minutes, the water stopped coming out. So maybe that was just water that was already in the loop that was still blowing out, but the secondary water separator was operating properly.

Roger. Did you make any changes in the suit loop configuration after you went from the egress mode to the cabin mode after insertion; that is, in particular, they're interested in knowing if you recall changing the diverter valve position to EGRESS at any time while you were on the secondary canister? Over.

No. I don't believe we did that at all, Bruce.

Okay, 11. Thank you. That sums up our questions for now, and we'll crank these back into the engineering pipeline and see what we can come up with.